loan period, one should not observe hedgers obtaining better contract terms with their lenders.
To investigate the ultimate e¤ect of hedging on …rm outcomes, we use a new, hand-collected dataset on derivatives contracts. For each …rm in our dataset, we also gather detailed information on private credit agreements. These matched data allow us to identify links between hedging activity, external …nancing costs, and investment restrictions. While we describe the data gathering process below, it is worth highlighting the key features of our approach. We focus on private credit agreements in the syndicated loan market because this market has become the largest source of corporate funding in the last two decades. 3 Importantly, our investigation requires …nely-de…ned data, and bank loans contain covenants that are more detailed, comprehensive, and tightly set than other credit instruments. With these considerations in mind, our data gathering process starts from a sample of loans collected from various sources. We then hand collect information on borrowers'derivatives usage from their SEC …lings. This yields a dataset of over one thousand individual …rms for which we obtain additional information on characteristics, such as size, pro…tability, and investment spending over several years.
Our evidence suggests that hedging reduces the cost of external …nancing and eases the …rm's investment process. The results we …nd are economically and statistically signi…cant. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in hedging intensity (the amount of interest rate and currency hedging over total assets) is associated with a reduction of about 54 basis points in loan spreads. This is a signi…cant number when compared to the average loan spread of 189 basis points (a 29% reduction).
We also estimate that a one-standard deviation increase in hedging intensity reduces by 20% the odds of having an investment restriction covenant in a loan contract. Our tests further characterize the direct, positive impact of hedging intensity on investment spending. In all, the estimates we present are new to the literature and highlight the economic signi…cance of corporate hedging.
Simultaneity is a source of concern for any study dealing with …nancial decision-making, including corporate risk management. Relative to other studies, this issue is minimized in our tests because loan spreads and capital expenditure restrictions are set by the …rms'creditors and by competitive forces in the market for loanable funds (i.e., observed outcomes are not …rm-choice variables). Moreover, as we discuss below, there is an "institutional mismatch"between providers of loan and hedging contracts (outcomes and treatment status are not jointly set by the …rm's creditors). Yet, …rms choose to accept the contracts that are observed by the econometrician. Accordingly, our inferences could be biased in case …rms'choices are confounded with factors that in ‡uence observed outcomes and that are not accounted for in our baseline model. To alleviate this problem, we need to …nd a variable (or instrument) that is related to …rms'hedging policies, but that is not directly related to their creditors'decisions regarding interest rates and capital expenditure restrictions.
3 Syndicated loan issuance grew from approximately $150 billion in 1987 to $1.7 trillion in 2007, surpassing corporate bond issuance to become the most important corporate …nancing channel.
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The literature does not provide much guidance on this estimation issue and we fail to identify events that could work as surrogates for "natural experiments in hedging." However, we identify a plausible instrumental approach that arises from institutional features of the U.S. tax system. When their relevant tax schedule is convex, …rms can reduce their expected tax liabilities by hedging in order to minimize income volatility (see, e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985) , Graham and Smith (1999) , and Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) ). The convexity of statutory tax rates thus provides …rms with incentives to hedge (inclusion restriction). At the same time, tax convexity per se is unlikely to exert a direct, …rst-order e¤ect on the terms creditors include in their …nancing agreements (exclusion restriction). 4 With these restrictions in place, we implement an instrumental variable-…xed e¤ects estimator that deals with endogeneity by exploiting tax-related non-linearities in the demand for hedging. 5 Our baseline results conform to a theory in which hedging eases …rm …nancing by reducing the likelihood of states in which costs of …nancial distress are high and the …rm engages in risk shifting.
Those results, however, may not show direct evidence of these dynamics. To substantiate our inferences, we then examine whether variables that capture the potential for …nancial distress and asset substitution modulate the relation between hedging and loan contracts in tandem with our central hypothesis.
As a …rst check, we include Altman's Z-score and its interaction with hedging in our baseline model. We would expect Z-score to have a negative impact on loan spreads since riskier …rms (those with lower Z-scores) should be charged higher interest. This is exactly what we …nd. More interesting, however, is the coe¢ cient attracted by the hedging-Z-score interaction term. This term returns a positive, statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient, implying a pronounced dampening of the negative association between Z-scores and loan spreads for …rms that hedge more. 6 Simply put, our estimations imply that hedging is more valuable for borrowers facing a higher likelihood of …nancial distress.
Examining whether asset substitution also changes the relation between hedging and loan spreads is more challenging. To capture that e¤ect, we use a surrogate proxy that re ‡ects a …rm's investment growth options; namely, the ratio of market-to-book value of assets (M/B). The premise behind this strategy is that …rms with more growth options should have greater latitude in shifting their investments towards riskier assets (see related approaches in Johnson (2003) and Eisdorfer (2008) ). We interact that proxy with hedging, similarly to what we do with Z-scores above. Our tests return a negative coe¢ cient on the hedging-M/B interaction, suggesting that the negative e¤ect of hedging on loan spreads is greater for …rms whose investment opportunity set is likely to allow for greater risk 4 Notice that this is an idiosyncratic, time-varying e¤ect that is di¢ cult to measure and price in a loan. At a more practical level, the loan o¢ cers we consulted say they do not consider subtle tax issues (such as convexity) in their loan pricing schemes because their claims on …rms'income are gross of taxes. 5 We show in Section II.B that identi…cation does not come from …rm income level, which would in ‡uence loan spreads, but from well-identi…ed non-linearities (e.g., kinks) in the tax schedules (after controlling for …rm income level). 6 As shown below, we reach similar conclusions when we study the interplay between …nancial distress and hedging using a "distance-to-default" proxy.
taking. In other words, hedging is more valuable for those …rms with a higher ability to risk-shift.
Our base tests show that hedging reduces promised, contractual rates in loan contracts. Naturally, the …rm's observed loan spread includes a portion compensating investors for the expected default loss due to idiosyncratic risks and a portion compensating investors for the undiversi…able risks of debt. Accordingly, the observed drop in spreads is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for the cost of capital to be reduced, since it could be caused by a drop in the expected default risk premium, rather than a drop in the (true) cost of debt. To better understand these e¤ects, we decompose the promised interest rate into expected default risk premium and true cost of debt, and examine how hedging a¤ects the true cost of debt. We …nd that hedging helps lower the true cost of debt, and the e¤ect of hedging is stronger in …rms that are near distress or that are more likely to engage in risk shifting.
We then turn our attention to the real-side implications of hedging. We do this by looking at the covenants associated with loan contracts, in particular those explicitly constraining investment.
We …nd that hedging signi…cantly reduces the likelihood of capital expenditure restrictions in loan agreements. Speci…cally, our tests suggest that the average IR/FX hedger is 20% less likely to have clauses restricting capital expenditures in its future credit agreements. Similarly, and also in line with our previous …ndings on the cost of borrowing, we …nd that hedging alters the link between measures of …rm risk (e.g., Z-scores) and the likelihood of capital expenditure restrictions.
To gain further insight on the hedging-investment relation, we also examine the direct impact of hedging on capital spending. Relative to a non-hedger counterfactual, we …nd that the average IR/FX hedger is able to increase investment spending by about 13% of the sample mean level of investment.
We also examine how heterogeneity in …rm …nancial conditions shapes the relation between hedging and investment. We …nd, for example, that hedging ameliorates the strong, negative relation between …nancial distress risk and investment.
Our paper contributes to various literatures. Our primary contribution to the hedging literature is to show that hedging has a …rst-order e¤ect on …rm …nancing and investment. To our knowledge, we are the …rst to simultaneously investigate the impact of hedging on the cost of debt, the likelihood of capital expenditure restrictions, and investment. We show two precise mechanisms -cost of debt …nancing and investment restrictions -through which hedging a¤ects corporate outcomes. Importantly, our …ndings on the negative relation between hedging and loan spreads provide new insights into how hedging a¤ects corporate wealth. Unlike other papers, we focus on creditors'evaluation of corporate hedging -prior studies examine hedging from shareholders' perspective. In this regard, our paper adds to the loan literature by showing that corporate hedging is an important determinant of loan contract terms. Finally, by explicitly connecting hedging and investment spending, our study adds to a new line of research on the real implications of …nancial contracting (e.g., Almeida et al. (2009) ). This line of inquiry is likely to o¤er important insights about the role of …nancial contracting 4 in the economy for policymakers and future researchers.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the sample selection process and construction of the hedging variables. Sections 3 and 4 present our empirical results on the interplay between hedging, loan spreads, and …rm investment. Section 5 presents robustness checks.
Section 6 looks at additional economic costs and bene…ts of hedging. Section 7 concludes the paper.
I Sample Selection and Variable Construction A Basic Sample Selection
To gauge the impact of hedging on …rms'access to credit, we need detailed information on contract terms. Importantly, the …nancing instruments examined need to be economically relevant and widely used by …rms. Private loan agreements have become the most important mode of external …nancing by …rms in the last two decades and …rms report detailed information on the terms governing these agreements. We begin our sampling with the dataset used in Nini et al. (2009) (hereafter referred to as the NSS sample), which contains information on various dimensions of loan agreements between …nancial institutions and …rms. 7 The NSS sample contains unique information on investment restrictions in loan covenants. This information enables us to examine whether hedging improves corporate investment by relaxing capital investment restrictions -evidence hitherto not reported in the literature. Notably, a sizeable window of the NSS sample coincides with a period in which rules governing the disclosure of derivatives usage allow for more precise measurement of hedging activities by …rms.
For each loan contract in the NSS sample, we collect the borrower's hedging information from the 10-K …led in the previous year. This lag is meant to ensure that hedging information can be assumed to be pre-determined. Our sample starts in 1996, the …rst year in the NSS dataset, and ends in 2002, when FASB SFAS 133 became e¤ective. SFAS 133 requires …rms to disclose the "fair market values"of derivatives contracts (as opposed to the notional values previously required by FASB SFAS 119). Graham and Rogers (2002) , among others, note that compared with notional value information, the fair value information reported under SFAS 133 reveals only limited information about derivatives usage.
The authors warn against the use of information reported under SFAS 133 in studies on …rm hedging. 8
B Hedging Variables

B.1 Data Collection Process
We use a web crawler program searching for keywords in every 10-K, 10-KT, 10-K405, 10KSB, and 10KSB40 for each of the 2,288 …rm-years of the NSS sample that fall in the 1996-2002 period. We use 7 We thank Amir Su… for making these data available in his website. 8 SFAS 119 requires …rms to disclose detailed derivatives information including the notional values, purpose, nature, and terms of their derivatives contracts. Some of this information is no longer required under SFAS 133.
the following keywords to locate information used in our data coding: "derivative", "hedg", "…nan-cial instrument", "swap", "market risk", "expos", "futures", "forward contract", "forward exchange", "option contract", "risk management", and "notional". When a keyword is found, we read the surrounding text and hand-code the hedging variables. As in prior derivatives studies (e.g., Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Graham and Rogers (2002) ), we focus on the use of interest rate (IR) and foreign exchange (FX) derivatives for non-trading purposes. If a …rm-year's 10-K has no reference of our hedging keywords, or contains such keywords but the surrounding text suggests the …rm does not use derivatives, we treat that …rm-year as non-user. We record a …rm's notional value of derivatives contracts as well as the information on a …rm's long and short positions in derivatives. 9 One must recognize that a …rm might not use derivatives because it has no relevant IR or FX exposure. To better understand the use of derivatives, we need to check whether the …rm-years we classify as non-users are ex-ante exposed to ‡uctuations in IR and FX prices, or are otherwise taking speculative positions. We determine whether …rms in our sample are ex-ante exposed to those market prices in two ways. First, we include keywords "expos" and "market risk" in our program search and we make a note if a …rm explicitly states that it has IR and/or FX exposures when we read its 10-K …ling. Second, we follow the procedure laid out in Graham and Rogers (2002, p.824) for identifying ex-ante IR and FX exposures. We infer that a …rm has no ex-ante exposure if it meets the following three conditions: (1) it does not use any IR or FX derivatives; (2) it does not state in its 10-K that it has ex-ante IR or FX exposures; and (3) the Graham and Rogers'procedure implies that the …rm has no ex-ante exposures. A total of 73 …rms fall into this category. We exclude these …rms from the non-user category because they are not suitable counterfactuals to those …rms that are exposed to IR and FX prices and use hedging for risk management.
Finally, we match the sample of loan contracts with LPC's DealScan. This allows us to obtain additional characteristics on loan contracts (such as loan size and maturity). We then gather additional …rm characteristics from COMPUSTAT. These include, among others, information on …rm size, pro…tability, credit ratings, market valuation, asset tangibility, and cash ‡ow volatility. Our …nal sample contains a total of 2,718 loan contracts signed by 1,185 individual …rms.
B.2 Proxies and Summary Statistics
The majority of papers using derivatives data (e.g., Géczy et al. (1997) , Allayannis and Weston (2001), and Purnanandam (2008) )) measure hedging activity with a hedging dummy and/or a continuous aggregate notional value of derivatives contracts (irrespective of the direction of the positions).
We follow this general approach and use multiple proxies for corporate hedging: (1) a dummy variable for whether the …rm reports IR hedging, (2) a continuous variable capturing the total notional value of IR derivatives contracts scaled by the …rm's total assets, (3) a dummy variable for FX hedging, (4) a continuous variable for the total notional value of FX derivatives contracts scaled by the …rm's total assets, (5) a dummy variable for the existence of IR and/or FX hedging, and (6) a continuous variable for the total notional value of IR and/or FX derivatives contracts scaled by the …rm's total assets ("hedging intensity"). 10 Panel A of Table I shows the summary statistics for our hedging variables. About 35.6% and 27.3% of the sample …rm-years use IR and FX derivatives, respectively. Some 50.1% of the sample …rm-years use IR and/or FX derivatives. These proportions are somewhat higher than the corresponding …gures reported in Graham and Rogers (2002) , who examine a random sample of 469 …rms (their corresponding …gures are 25.0%, 24.2%, and 35.7%) for the …scal year 1995-6. Regarding the intensity of derivatives use by our sample …rms, the total notional value of derivatives contracts for derivatives users is about 13.8%, 7.5%, and 14.0% of total assets for IR hedging, FX hedging, and IR/FX hedging, respectively. These …gures are similar to those reported in Graham and Rogers (2002) , which equal 11.1%, 8.1%, and 13.2%.
Insert table I Here
Panel A also reports summary statistics on loan characteristics. The average loan size is about 291.6 million dollars, the average loan spread (based on DealScan's all-in-spread drawn) is 188.6 basis points over LIBOR, and the average loan maturity is 1,345 days (about 45 months). In addition, 73.1% of loan contracts have contingent performance-based pricing terms and 37.3% of the loans contain an explicit restriction on capital expenditures. Finally, about 38.1% of the credit facilities in the sample are term-loans, whereas the remainder can be classi…ed as revolving and other loans. These spread and maturity …gures are higher than those found in related studies such as and Ivashina (2009) , who report spreads that average around 117 to 140 basis points over LIBOR and maturity that averages about 39 months. The panel also reports summary statistics on …rm characteristics such as …rm size (the natural log of book value of total assets), asset tangibility (net PP&E over total assets), pro…tability (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization over total assets), cash ‡ow volatility (the standard deviation of quarterly cash ‡ows from operations over the four …scal years before the loan initiation year scaled by total debt), growth opportunities (proxied by the market-to-book ratio), and leverage (de…ned as total debt/total assets). 11 1 0 Graham and Rogers (2002) is the only study using a net notional value (by o¤setting long and short positions). We experiment with the use of net notional value as a robustness check for our main results.
1 1 It is useful to brie ‡y contrast the characteristics of the …rms in our sample with those in the COMPUSTAT universe. Standard mean-di¤erence tests suggest that our …rms are somewhat larger. At the same time, …rms in our sample and those in COMPUSTAT have similar levels of tangibility, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests suggest that the industry composition (distribution) of our sample is indistinguishable from that of COMPUSTAT.
In Panel B, we compare the characteristics of …rms with and without hedging contracts in place (hedgers versus non-hedgers). We …nd that hedgers are larger, more leveraged, and exhibit lower cash ‡ow and asset volatility, as well as a lower default risk (as measured by Z-score). We also …nd that hedgers tend to have higher asset tangibility, although the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant at the 5% test level. These results are largely consistent with the previous …ndings documented in the literature (e.g., Nance et al. (1993) and Géczy et al. (1997) ). More importantly, hedgers are signi…cantly di¤erent from non-hedgers with respect to loan characteristics and investment spending.
Hedgers tend to access larger loans at lower loan spreads. Simple mean comparison between hedgers and non-hedgers indicates a 31 basis points di¤erence in spreads, which is about 15% of the sample average spread for non-hedgers. We also …nd that hedgers, on average, are 20% less likely to have capital expenditures restrictions in their loan agreements, and they tend to invest roughly 10% more than non-hedgers. These univariate results provide preliminary support for our main hypotheses.
We, however, shall perform more rigorous tests in the following sections.
II Hedging and the Cost of Credit A Baseline Model
We use regression analysis to examine the e¤ects of hedging on the cost of debt …nancing. While the literature o¤ers many ways to model the pricing of private credit agreements, we largely follow the empirical model proposed by Graham et al. (2008) -itself a summary of prior modeling approaches.
That model contains a long list of drivers of loan interest rates (including …rm characteristics, loan characteristics, macroeconomic variables, and idiosyncratic-…xed e¤ects) to which we add our hedging variables. Our baseline model can be written in condensed form as follows:
Log(Loan Spread) = f (Hedging Variables, Firm Characteristics, Loan Characteristics Macroeconomic Variables, Idiosyncratic Fixed E¤ ects)
As in Graham et al. (2008) , we take the natural logarithm of loan spread to mitigate the e¤ect of skewness in data. Importantly, the model controls for …rm and loan characteristics that may a¤ect loan spreads. For instance, prior literature has hypothesized that when a borrower has dealt with the current lender in the past, there are fewer information asymmetries (e.g., Chava and Roberts (2008) ). We include the natural logarithm of (1 + the number of previous loans with the current lender) as a proxy for the depth of the relationship between the borrower and lender, expecting it to be negatively related to loan spreads. In addition, we expect …rms with higher credit ratings to obtain more favorable loan terms (e.g., a lower interest rate) than …rms with lower or without ratings.
Accordingly, we include dummies for the borrower's S&P ratings categories in the model. About 26%
of observations in our sample do not have a credit rating. To avoid loss of data, we assign a dummy variable that equals one when credit rating is missing.
Our …rm-level controls include …rm size, pro…tability, asset tangibility, M/B, cash ‡ow volatility, and leverage. 12 We also include asset volatility in the model. In the presence of basis (unhedgeable) risk, a higher degree of asset volatility typically means less hedging (see Haushalter (2000) and Brown
and Toft (2002)). To help assure that hedging is not simply capturing this e¤ect, one must control for asset volatility. 13 We expect a positive link between asset volatility and loan spread. Finally, the modi…ed Altman's (1968) Z-score is included to further control for default risk. A higher Z-score indicates better …nancial health and thus a lower default risk. We compute each of these proxies in standard ways. To save space we describe the details of their calculations in Appendix II. The model controls for industry-…xed e¤ects by including industry dummies (2-digit SIC codes).
Importantly, all …rm variables enter our models with a one-year lag from the loan origination.
In other words, we work with pre-determined values of those variables. So, for example, whether the …rm has a hedging policy in place is determined at least one year before the …rm arranges the loan contract whose characteristics we consider. Our tests correct the error structure for within-…rm correlation (clustering) and heteroskedasticity using the White-Huber's estimator. 14 Following Graham et al. (2008) , we also control for loan characteristics that might a¤ect spreads.
We include the natural log of loan size in the model to capture the potential economies of scale in bank lending, which might result in a lower spread. Furthermore, we control for loan maturity (de…ned as the natural log of maturity in days) because banks often require a liquidity premium for long-term debt and the premium will translate into a higher spread. We also include a dummy variable for performance pricing. We further control for the e¤ects of loan type and loan purpose. Loans can be of di¤erent types, such as term loans, revolvers longer than one year, revolvers shorter than one year, and 364-day loans. report that the pricing of term loans can be very di¤erent from that of revolving loans, thus we include dummy variables for each loan type. Likewise, we classify loans in "loan purpose" categories: working capital or general corporate purpose, re…nancing, acquisition, commercial paper backup, and others. For brevity, the coe¢ cients of these dummies are not reported.
Macroeconomic conditions might also a¤ect loan pricing Graham et al. (2008) . Relatedly, recent literature (see Faulkender (2005) and Chernenko and Faulkender (2010) ) shows that …rms may selectively hedge their interest rate risks and time the use of derivatives based on macroeconomic conditions. It is thus possible that …rms may time loans in a way that is correlated with aggregate conditions and hedging. To avoid this source of omitted variable bias, we follow this literature and include credit spread and term spread as controls in our model. Credit spread is computed as the di¤erence between the yields of BAA and AAA corporate bonds, and term spread is the di¤erence between the yield of 10-year and 1-year Treasury bonds. The literature suggests that term spread tends to widen in economic expansions and shrink in recessions. In contrast, the credit spread tends to widen in recessions and shrink in expansions (see Graham et al.) . We thus expect a positive link between credit spread and loan spread and a negative link between term spread and loan spread.
In addition to the contract "timing mismatch"(imposed lag structure) described above, we highlight the "institutional mismatch"between providers of hedging and loan contracts. In the U.S., only a few, large …nancial institutions -many of which are nonbank …rms -o¤er hedging contracts. In particular, according to 2002 statistics from the Fed's regulatory dataset, the top 5 (10) providers concentrated over 85% (95%) of the FX and IR hedging contracts outstanding. In contrast, the loan contracts we examine come from a large spectrum of commercial banks (there are nearly 1,500 di¤erent banks in our sample). Very rarely the same …nancial institution would provide the two contracts examined in our tests. Indeed, we spot-checked the 10-Ks of a random sample of …rms in 2002 and found no match between the providers of hedging and loan contracts. We also veri…ed that the largest 10 derivative providers lead only about 4% of the loans in our sample, and that our results are insensitive to the deletion of these observations.
B A Tax-Based Instrumental Approach
Although we have taken precautions to address the issue of biases arising from reverse-causality and omitted variables, endogeneity remains as a concern in our estimations. In this section, we develop an instrumental variable approach to more explicitly handle concerns about estimation biases.
We identify a candidate instrument for hedging that arises from a salient feature of the rules governing corporate taxes; namely, tax convexity. The risk management literature has long argued that hedging can lower the volatility of future taxable income, thus lowering expected tax liabilities for …rms facing convex tax schedules (e.g., Smith and Stulz (1985) and Graham and Smith (1999) ). Green and Talmor (1985) , for example, show that in the presence of asymmetric tax treatment of positive and negative incomes, the tax liability of a …rm can be thought of as a government-written call option on future income streams, with the strike price equal to the value of allowable deductions on taxable earnings. Accordingly, as the volatility of pre-tax earnings declines, the value of the call option -the amount of the tax liabilities -drops. This gives …rms an incentive to hedge. Graham and Smith further report that roughly 50% of the …rms in COMPUSTAT face e¤ective tax functions that are convex.
In the U.S., tax convexity is a function of the non-linear treatment assigned to corporate earnings in the tax code (tax brackets), the existence of net operating loss carryforwards and carrybacks, 15 investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax. The tax convexity estimation of Graham and Smith (1999) captures all of the aforementioned features of the tax code and measures the expected tax savings from hedging. Notably, not all …rms face the same tax convexities, nor would they bene…t the same by hedging their income for tax reasons. Our instrumental approach builds on this source of heterogeneity in …rms'hedging-related tax bene…ts.
In what follows, we employ the procedure described in Graham and Smith (p.2256) to calculate tax convexity. Speci…cally, the expected percentage savings in tax liability arising from a 5% reduction in the volatility of taxable income (denoted Convexity) is calculated for every …rm-year as a follows: comes from the non-linear form of the income taxation function, rather than the income level itself (which is already included in Eq. (1)). Indeed, Convexity is a highly non-linear function of income.
For our purposes, the key observation is that tax convexity provides incentives for …rms to hedge (instrument inclusion restriction), but a priori, there is no reason to expect it to directly a¤ect the terms of bank loans (exclusion restriction). Under this premise, tax convexity is a plausible instrument for hedging in a loan spread regression. Indeed, using the Graham-Smith tax-convexity construct, prior papers have found support for the hypothesis that …rms hedge with the goal of minimizing taxes (e.g., Dionne and Garand (2003) , Dionne and Triki (2005) , and Lin et al. (2008) ). Others, however, …nd only weak evidence of this e¤ect (e.g., Graham and Rogers (2002) ). Accordingly, we need to verify that our approach is robust to alternative assumptions about what is included in the instrument set. This set must also have good statistical properties (pass validity and relevance tests).
The various tests reported below focus on demonstrating that our instrumental approach is sound. 16 Our instrumental variable estimations are performed in two stages. In the …rst stage, hedging intensity is regressed on the lagged excluded instrument (Convexity) and all of the independent variables in the loan spread model (Eq. (1)). The "predicted hedging" from the …rst stage is then used in the second-stage loan spread model. The …rst-stage regression results are not reported in full to save space; instead, the relevant test statistics are reported in all of our tables. In all cases, the tax convexity variable is found to have a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on hedging. Accordingly, as reported, the F -tests of the signi…cance of the instrument in the …rst-stage model are always highly signi…cant (p-values lower than 0.001). More illustrative than these exclusion F -tests, however, are the Shea's (1997) R 2 's from the …rst-stage regressions (also reported in all tables). These R 2 's all exceed the suggested ("rule of thumb") hurdle of 10%. These various statistics suggest that our instrument is relevant in explaining the variation of our models'potentially endogenous regressors.
C Empirical Results
C.1 Baseline Loan Spread Model
To gauge the direct e¤ect of hedging on loan spreads, we study, separately, an IR hedging dummy for whether the …rm has IR derivatives contracts in place; a continuous IR intensity hedging measure (i.e., total notional value of IR derivatives contracts scaled by the …rm's total assets); a FX hedging dummy; a continuous FX hedging intensity measure (total notional value of FX derivatives scaled by total assets); an IR/FX hedging dummy combining the IR and FX dummies; and a continuous IR/FX intensity measure (total notional value of IR and FX derivatives scaled by total assets). Our inferences are similar for each one of these hedging proxies. To avoid redundancy, however, we only discuss the results based on the IR/FX hedging intensity measure. 17 Table II hedging-to-asset ratio reported in Table I ). Relative to the average loan spread of 189 basis points, this represents a reduction of about 53 basis points. To present these e¤ects in an alternative way, a one-standard deviation increase in hedging intensity at the average level of hedging leads to a 29% reduction in spreads. Hedging has a strong, sizeable impact on the cost of credit.
To ameliorate this concern, we expunge from the calculation of Convexity those "suspicious" components proxying for volatility (e.g., T IV ol). The results (available from the authors) are consistent with our the results presented below, suggesting again that we do obtain independent variation coming from the tax-based instrument. et al. (2008) . Like those authors, we also obtain a negative relation between market-to-book ratios and loan spreads. Loan characteristics such as loan size and maturity also conform to our priors.
The results for the macro variables, too, agree with our priors. Recall, our regressions, also include a performance pricing dummy, loan type and purpose dummies, and credit ratings dummies; their coe¢ cients are largely signi…cant, but omitted for brevity.
To our knowledge, this is the …rst study in the literature to show that corporate hedging is associated with lower loan interest rates. These initial results complement and extend the …nding of Graham and Rogers (2002) that hedging increases a …rm's debt capacity. Both studies are consistent with the notion that creditors value positively a …rm's decision to hedge, and they provide more favorable credit terms to …rms that hedge. Our results on the e¤ect of hedging on loan pricing are also consistent with Petersen and Thiagarajan's (2000) …ndings on the moderating e¤ect of hedging on the cost of equity. Together with these pieces of evidence, our results more broadly imply that hedging eases …rms'access to external …nancing. To better characterize our story, we examine in more detail factors underlying the negative association between hedging and loan spreads that we have uncovered. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that if …nancial distress is costly, hedging can ease external funding by lowering income volatility. According to their theory, hedging may be particularly more valuable for …rms with a higher probability of …nancial distress. In contrast, the bene…ts of hedging for …nancially strong borrowers may be more
marginal. In what follows, we explore cross-sectional variation in …rms'…nancial positions to verify whether our baseline results can indeed be attributed to existing hedging theories.
We examine the …nancial distress argument by including Altman's Z-score and its interaction with hedging in our baseline model. The result from this test is reported in column (3) of Table II .
We expect the uninteracted Z-score to have a negative impact on loan spreads since, all else equal, healthier …rms should be charged lower spreads. This is exactly what we …nd, with a high degree of statistical signi…cance. More interesting, however, is the coe¢ cient of the hedging-Z-score interaction term. This term returns a positive, statistically signi…cant coe¢ cient, implying a weakening of the negative association between Z-score and loan spreads for …rms that hedge. Put di¤erently, consistent with the theory, hedging is particularly more valuable for borrowers with a higher likelihood of 13 …nancial distress. It is interesting to gauge the economic signi…cance of our results. The estimates in column (3) imply that a one-standard deviation decline in Z-score increases the loan spread of an average hedger by 16 basis points less than a similar decline in Z-score for a non-hedger.
In addition to ameliorating …nancial distress risk, theory suggests that hedging may be bene…cial for creditors by limiting …rms' scope for substitution towards riskier investments (risk-shifting). It is thus interesting to examine if the dynamics of our hedging-loan spreads results are modulated by the degree to which …rms might be able to engage in asset substitution. While it is di¢ cult to gauge directly a …rm's ability to risk-shift, standard …nance theory suggests that …rms with more growth opportunities tend to be riskier than …rms with fewer growth opportunities (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognize the bene…ts of hedging through the e¤ect it has on the cost of funds of growth …rms. Using the …gures from column (4), we obtain that increasing M/B by one unit (which is about one standard deviation of M/B) decreases loan spreads of an average hedger by 11 basis points less than a similar increase in M/B for a …rm without hedging contracts in place.
III Hedging and Investment
One way in which the bene…ts of hedging may manifest relates to the contractual restrictions creditors impose on …rms that hedge. In particular, together with lower interest rates, it is likely that creditors will impose fewer contractual restrictions on …rms'spending when "hedging insurance"is in place (see Bessembinder (1991) ). Naturally, the relevant question is whether hedging ultimately shapes the …rm's investment process. These important questions on the real-side implications of …nancial decisions have been largely ignored in the hedging literature. This section examines both of these questions.
A Capital Expenditure Restrictions
We …rst examine whether hedging has a direct impact on investment restrictions in loan agreements.
Research suggests that investment restriction clauses in bank loans are particularly interesting because these clauses are tailored according to the particular characteristics of each borrower, di¤erently from the "generally-worded"indentures of public bonds. Accordingly, the choice of including capital expenditures restrictions in debt contracts should closely re ‡ect creditors' assessment of borrower-speci…c 14 credit risk.
We examine this hypothesis by regressing a dummy variable denoting the existence of capital expenditure restrictions on IR/FX hedging intensity, controlling for various …rm and loan characteristics. The controls used in these estimations are similar to those in Eq. (1). All models are estimated via probit-IV.
Table III About Here
Our results are reported in Table III . To ease the exposition, the coe¢ cient estimates are transformed to represent the marginal e¤ects evaluated at the means of the independent variables from the regressions. The …rm characteristic coe¢ cients (e.g., size, pro…tability, and leverage) are comparable to those observed in the loan spreads of Table II (the same economic intuition applies, which we omit for brevity).
More important for our purposes are the coe¢ cients associated with hedging. The estimates show a negative, statistically signi…cant relation between hedging and the odds of having capital expenditure restrictions in loan agreements. Speci…cally, results from column (1), imply that being an average IR/FX hedger decreases the probability of having an expenditure restriction by about 20%.
This number is quite signi…cant. Relative to the sample mean, it represents a 54% decline in the odds of having a capital expenditure restriction.
The evidence in Table III suggests a new channel through which hedging improves corporate outcomes: it reduces the odds that creditors will impose constraints on …rms'investment decisions.
We believe our evidence is important in ‡ashing out precise mechanisms that underlie links between …nancial and investment decisions inside the …rm. While there is evidence that these decisions move together (see Stein (2003) for a review), we still know very little about how they are connected. The evidence introduced by this paper helps us better understand these connections.
Finally, we have shown that …nancial distress and risk-shifting proxies modulate the e¤ect of hedging on the cost of external funding. The same rationale used in the tests of Section C.2 applies when examining the impact of hedging on the investment covenants: higher …nancial distress risk and higher potential for asset substitution should make hedging particularly more desirable for creditors, leading to a relaxation on investment covenants. We verify these hypotheses in turn.
We augment the capital restriction covenants of column (1) with the inclusion of an interaction term for hedging and Z-score (similar to the approach of Table II) . The results are reported in column (2). The estimates show that …rms with a higher chance of …nancial distress (as denoted by a low Zscore) are more likely to be imposed capital expenditure restrictions. At the same time, given an hypothetical one-standard deviation drop in Z-score, a non-hedger will see a 15.5% increase in the likelihood that its lender will impose a capital expenditure restriction, while for a counterfactual hedger …rm the increase in the likelihood of a restriction is only one third of that, or a statistically insigni…cant 5.2%.
In column (3) we interact M/B with hedging intensity. The coe¢ cient returned for the hedging-M/B interaction term is negative and statistically signi…cant. The estimation suggests that growth …rms that hedge have lower odds of having capital expenditure restrictions in their loans.
B The Impact of Hedging on Investment Spending
Our …ndings suggest that hedging reduces the incidence of investment restrictions in loan agreements.
This should give …rms greater ‡exibility in their investment decisions. Since we also …nd that hedgers raise funds at lower costs, it would be natural to investigate whether …nancial hedging programs ultimately shape …rms' investment spending (see also Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) ). In this section, we estimate empirical investment models in which a …rm's asset-scaled capital expenditures are regressed on a large set of variables containing information on …rm and loan characteristics, as well as on hedging. This set of variables, which come from Eq. (1), encompasses those commonly found in the corporate investment literature (see, e.g., Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ). 18 The results from the IV estimations of our investment model are in Table IV We also interact hedging with Z-score and M/B. We do so because we expect the impact of hedging on investment to vary across …rms that face di¤erent likelihood of distress and have di¤erent investment choice sets. Results under column (2) of Table IV show that the coe¢ cient on the interaction term between hedging and Z-score is negative and signi…cant, implying that hedging relaxes the link between Z-score and investment. In particular, they imply that low Z-score …rms that hedge invest more than low Z-score …rms that do not hedge. To use a concrete example, consider again a one-standard deviation drop in Z-score. For a …rm that does not hedge that decline will lead to a drop in investment of about 9.5% of the average sample investment rate. For an average hedger, the same drop in Z-score would imply an equivalent drop in investment of only 4.6% of the sample mean.
Column (3) reports results from a model in which we interact hedging and M/B. The hedging-M/B interaction term is positive and statistically signi…cant, supporting the idea that hedging allows …rms with greater growth options to invest more. For example, increasing M/B by one unit boosts annual investment rate by 3% for average hedgers, which is about 39% of the sample mean of investment.
The …ndings of this section complement and extend the existing evidence on …nancing frictions and investment. Chava and Roberts (2008) …nd that a borrower's capital expenditures decline by about 13% in response to a …nancial covenant violation. Nini et al. (2009) further document that capital expenditure restrictions are common, and borrowing …rms'investment rate fall by 15% (relative to the sample mean) after an investment restriction is imposed on their loans. In contrast, we …nd that being an average IR/FX hedger reduces the chance of having a capital expenditure restriction by about 20%, and that engaging in hedging activities increases a …rm's annual investment rate by about 13%
(relative to sample mean). Further analyses that we conduct considering …nancial distress risk and growth opportunities provide additional insights about the impact of hedging on investment spending.
IV Robustness Checks
In this section, we test the robustness of our inferences to the use of alternative hedging measures and estimation methods. We do so perturbing the estimation that produces our weakest results (under column (1) of Table II) . First, Graham and Rogers (2002) argue that the net notional value of derivatives might be a better measure of a …rm's hedging position than the total notional value. As a robustness check, in column (1) of Table V we measure the extent of hedging as the net notional value of derivatives contracts scaled by total assets. As some …rms are vague in reporting the direction of hedging positions in their SEC …lings, we follow Graham and Rogers and exclude these "unsure cases" from the analysis. Still, the estimated hedging "premium" (reduction in loan spreads) associated with a one-standard deviation increase in hedging remains economically signi…cant, equal to 23%. The conclusion that hedging lowers loan spread is robust to the use of net notional value of derivatives.
Table V About Here
Second, we experiment with proxies for the likelihood of future default in our baseline model.
Recent research has proposed the use of "distance-to-default" (DTD) as a plausible candidate. In the bank loan literature, Drucker and Puri (2009) use this measure to assess whether a borrower may default in the future, which a¤ects the expected length of the relationship with its lender. Following Drucker and Puri, we implement the DTD measure that is operationalized in Crosbie and Bohn (2003) . In column (2) of Table V , we use this proxy in lieu of Z-score. The DTD proxy attracts the expected negative coe¢ cient, but this brings no signi…cant changes to the coe¢ cient of the IR/FX hedging-to-asset variable. Although not reported in the table, we reestimate all our hedging-Z-score interactive models replacing Z-score with DTD. Our conclusions about the interplay between distress and hedging remain the same.
About 60% of our sample …rms have more than one loan in the 1996-2002 period. We exploit the panel data structure of part of our sample to check whether our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for time-invariant …rm characteristics. In column (3) of Table V , we estimate a …rm-…xed e¤ects regression. Naturally, the …rms that have just one loan in our sample period are dropped from the estimation. Yet, the reduced sample provides an opportunity to gauge the tenor of our results.
We …nd that the IR/FX hedging proxy still attracts a negative and highly signi…cant coe¢ cient.
While the statistics reported in Table I suggest little evidence of gross outliers in loan spreads, we estimate a median regression as an additional check. The result on the IR/FX hedging ratio in column (4) of Table V is qualitatively similar to that of our baseline regressions Finally, note that our analysis is conducted at the loan level. However, as discussed in Graham et al. (2008) , individual loans are often part of a multiple-loan deals, and their terms may simply re ‡ect the deal-level negotiation (i.e., they are not completely independent observations). Treating these loans as independent credit facilities could in ‡ate the statistical signi…cance of our results. To check whether this is an issue, we follow Graham et al. and aggregate loans into "deals" using loan-size weighted averages of the relevant loan terms. The slope estimate for the IR/FX hedging variable in column (5) of Table V indicates the deal-level bias story does not a¤ect our inferences.
We also perform robustness checks for our regression models on the probability of having a capital expenditure restriction in a loan contract. These checks (available upon request) indicate that our inferences about investment restrictions are equally robust to changes in model speci…cation, sample selection, and use of alternative econometric techniques.
V The Economic Value of Corporate Hedging
Our analysis shows evidence that hedging reduces interest rate spreads and the incidence of investment restrictions in loan agreements, which in turn result in higher investment rates. These …ndings are consistent with existing evidence on the valuation gains associated with hedging (e.g., Allayannis
and Weston (2001)). It is therefore natural that we dig deeper into the economic value of corporate hedging. In this section, we …rst study the relation between hedging and the true cost of corporate debt; i.e., we go beyond the analysis of loan spreads. We then look at the value implication of investment increases that come from hedging. While the tests performed here are more tentative, they provide a step forward in our understanding of the economic implications of hedging.
A Hedging and the True Cost of Debt
Our tests show that hedging lowers contractual loan spreads. These results are interesting in their own right, however, they need not imply that hedging reduces the …rm's true cost of debt.
The …rm's observed debt spread includes a portion compensating investors for the expected default loss and a portion compensating investors for the undiversi…able risk of debt (i.e., the expected return premium or "true" cost of debt). 19 More precisely, the contractual debt yield can be expressed as:
Promised Debt Yield = Cost of Debt + Yield Equivalent of Expected Default Loss.
In our case, the observed drop in the loan spread (promised debt yield) for hedgers could be caused by a drop in the expected default risk premium, rather than a drop in the (true) cost of debt, as a result of hedging. This distinction is important in that only the latter e¤ect is a su¢ cient condition for hedging to increase …rm value via debt …nancing. 20
In this section, we examine how hedging a¤ects the cost of debt. Our analysis builds on recent empirical studies decomposing promised interest rates into expected default risk premia and underlying debt costs (e.g., Elton et al. (2001) and Cooper and Davydenko (2007) ). We leave the details of the computation of these di¤erent components to Appendix I. Here, we are interested in testing the empirical relation between the computed cost of debt and hedging. Table I shows that the mean cost of debt in our sample is 132 basis points, roughly 70% of the mean promised loan spread. This relative ratio is very similar to the 66% …gure reported in Elton et al. (2001) . 21 Table VI presents results from regressing the log of true cost of debt on …rm hedging.
The estimated models are similar to Eq. (1), except that the dependent variable (Cost of Debt)
is computed as Eq. (5) Table II ), but also the true cost of debt. When we include the interaction between hedging and Z-score or the interaction between M/B ratio and hedging, we obtain results that, again, resemble those of Table II . That is, hedging has a particularly strong e¤ect on the true cost of debt of those …rms that are near distress or that are more likely to risk-shift. 
B Estimating the Real-Side Bene…ts and Costs of Corporate Hedging Programs
A natural and interesting question is whether hedging adds value by boosting a …rm's real-side activities. In our context, a …rm may bene…t from the additional investment that is made possible as a result of hedging. Hedging programs, however, are not cost-free. Bearing in mind the limitations of the data, we try to provide a rough estimation of the net gains from hedging for the average …rm in our sample.
Bene…ts. The proportional change in loan spreads that is brought about by hedging can be calculated by multiplying the regression coe¢ cient in column (2) of Table II (= 2:02) by the …rm's hedging amount (IR/FX hedging). The annual interest rate saving can be then estimated by multiplying the reduction in loan spread and the total amount of loans in a …rm-year. The return from additional investment can be computed as follows: regression coe¢ cient in column (1) of Table IV (= 0:07) hedging amount lagged total assets mean ROA in the previous …ve years.
Costs. The …rm needs to pay a bid-ask spread when entering an IR/FX derivatives contract, and it also needs to pay a premium for buying an option contract. Costs arising from bid-ask spreads in forward and swap contracts are calculated at 1.5 basis points of the notional value of those derivatives (cf. Hull (2008)). The costs associated with the options contract is calculated at 1.5 basis points of the notional value (estimated from Brown (2001)). Option premium may vary according to the underlying security, time to maturity, and other factors. While information on premiums for over-thecounter option contracts is not available, we use the average 1% premium rate for an at-the-money option traded at the Philadelphia Stock Exchange as a proxy. Annual cost of running a hedging program is estimated at 1.5 basis point of annual sales (see Brown (2001) ).
We then compute the di¤erence between the above bene…ts and costs. Finally, after applying a …rm's simulated marginal tax rate to the computed net gain, we compare it to the …rm's income before extraordinary items. 22 We …nd that the average …rm in our sample has an annual net gain from hedging of about 4.7% of its annual income. It is worth noting, however, that our estimate is likely to be a conservative …gure. First, we do not consider many other bene…ts of hedging in the analysis (e.g., improved contract terms when dealing with stakeholders such as suppliers and employees). Second, our calculation is likely to overstate the cost of hedging. For example, …rms engaging in the use of options may buy and sell options simultaneously (e.g., using a collar strategy) in order to lower the cost of derivatives hedging. Indeed, the …rm analyzed in Brown (2001) reports a negative option premium, suggesting that the …rm sells more options than that it buys.
While the evidence in this section is arguably more tentative, it substantiates the notion that hedging contributes to corporate valuation. This is an important …nding in that it may help us understand -though not fully explain -evidence suggesting that hedging adds value (e.g., Allayannis and Weston (2001)). Future research should further our knowledge of the value implications of corporate hedging.
VI Concluding Remarks
While research on corporate risk management has long focused on the determinants of corporate hedging, recent studies investigate the value implications of hedging. This paper advances the research in the area by examining the e¤ects of hedging policies on …rms'access to capital (the price of bank loans) and on their ability to invest (contractual restrictions on investment spending). We Graham and Rogers (2002) . A long position is a contract that bene…ts from rising interest rates or the appreciation of a foreign currency. We add basis swaps (that are an exchange of ‡oating rate indices) to the absolute net notional value of IR derivatives. Cases when information is not suf…cient for us to judge whether a derivatives position is long or short are excluded from the calculation of net position.
Firm characteristics Log assets
Natural log of total assets = log(data6). Pro…tability
Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)/total assets = data13/data6. Tangibility Net property, plant and equipment/total assets = data8/data6. Cash ‡ow volatility Standard deviation of quarterly cash ‡ows from operations (quarterly data 108) over the four …scal years prior to the loan initiation year/total debt. M/B (Market-to-book) (Market value of equity plus the book value of debt)/total assets = (data25 data199 + data6 -data60)/data6. Leverage (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/total assets = (data9 + data34)/data6. Z-score Modi…ed Altman's (1968) Z-score = (1.2 working capital + 1.4 retained earnings + 3.3 EBIT + 0.999 sales)/total assets = (1.2 data179 + 1.4 data36 + 3.3 data170 + 0.999 data12)/data6. The ratio of market value of equity to book value of total debt is omitted from calculation, because market-to-book enters the regressions as a separate variable. Distance-to-default A market-based measure of default risk based on KMV-Merton methodology described in Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and is equal to (V a -D)/(V a a ), where D is debt, de…ned as the debt in current liabilities plus one-half long-term debt, V a is the market value of assets, and a is the one-year asset volatility. V a and a are unobservable. They are approximated by using the market value of equity (V e ), the one-year equity volatility ( e ), the three-month treasury bill rate (r), and debt (D) to solve Merton's (1974) 
Asset volatility
De…ned as a in the calculation of distance-to-default.
Covenant restrictions on CAPEX
Dummy variable that takes the value one when there is a restriction on capital expenditure in debt covenant. Investment/lagged assets Capital expenditure/lagged total assets = (data128/lagged data6).
Firm's previous loans Natural log of (1 + the number of previous loan contracts between the borrowing …rm and the current bank lender), a proxy for previous lending relationship.
Marginal tax rate
Marginal tax rate is the simulated marginal tax rates that are obtained from John Graham and is measured before a …rm/year's hedging activities. Tax convexity A dollar amount of tax saving from a …ve percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income, calculated as a function of a small negative taxable income dummy, a small positive taxable income dummy, volatility of taxable income, serial correlation of taxable income, the existence of investment tax credit in balance sheet, the existence of net operating losses and its interaction with the small negative and positive income dummies. Further detailes are in Smith (1999, p.2256) . We calculate both volatility of taxable income and serial correlation of taxable income on a rolling basis using all available historical annual data (since 1965) up to a particular calculation year. Since our regression models have separately included a cash ‡ow volatility measure, we also estimate a modi…ed tax convexity by omitting volatility of taxable income from the convexity calculation and the results are robust. Credit rating dummies Dummy variable for each category of S&P …rm ratings including AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, a B or worse rating. We also assign a dummy for …rms without the S&P rating.
Loan characteristics Loan spread
Loan spread is measured as all-in-spread drawn charged by the bank over LIBOR for the drawn portion of the loan facility, reported in the DealScan database.
Cost of debt
Loan spread minus yield equivalent of expected default loss ( ), calculated according to the procedure suggested by Cooper and Davydenko (2007) . Log maturity Natural log of the loan maturity in days. Log loan size Natural log of the loan (facility) amount, measured in millions of dollars. Performance pricing dummy Dummy variable that equals one if the loan facility uses performance pricing. Loan type dummies Dummy variable for each loan type, including term loan, revolver greater than one year, revolver less than one year, and 364-day facility. Loan purpose dummies Dummy variable for loan purposes, including corporate purpose, working capital, debt repayment, acquisition, backup line for commercial paper, and others. Others Industry dummies Industry dummies are based on 2-digit SIC code.
Credit spreads
The di¤erence between the yields of average BAA corporate bond and AAA corporate bond.
Term spreads
The di¤erence between the yields of 10-years Treasury bonds and 1-year Treasury bonds.
24 Notes: The dependent variable is log of loan spread. In column (1), results are estimated via OLS. In columns (2) to (4), results are obtained from IV estimations. The instrumental variable for hedging is a …rm's tax convexity (Graham and Smith (1999) Notes: The dependent variable is log of loan spread. In columns (1) and (2), the estimations are via OLS. Column (3) is a …rm-…xed e¤ect estimation. Column (4) is a median regression with pseudo-R 2 reported. Column (5) is the deal-level OLS regression. Net IR/FX hedging is net interest rate and net currency hedging scaled by assets. IR/FX hedging is the total amount of interest rate and currency hedging scaled by assets. All variable de…nitions are reported in Appendix II. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the …rm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Notes: The dependent variable is log of cost of debt (Cooper and Davydenko (2007) ). The results are obtained from IV estimations. The instrument for hedging is a …rm's tax convexity. IR/FX hedging is the total amount of interest rate and currency hedging scaled by assets. All variable de…nitions are reported in Appendix II. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the …rm level are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical signi…cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
